Force Majeure in International Contracts 2026

The Latin maxim pacta sunt servanda, that agreements must be honoured, forms the bedrock of international commercial law. Force majeure is its sole principled exception: the doctrine that excuses performance when an event beyond a party’s reasonable control makes that performance impossible. But force majeure is not a general escape clause from an unprofitable or inconvenient contract.

Under the governing frameworks, the ICC Force Majeure Clause (2020), UNIDROIT Principles Article 7.1.7, CISG Article 79, English common law frustration, and US doctrines of impossibility and impracticability, the claiming party must satisfy a demanding three-part test:

2. War and the Force Majeure Battleground: The 2026 Iran Conflict

The conflict commencing 28 February 2026, involving US and Israeli strikes on Iran and the consequent disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, triggered the most significant wave of force majeure declarations in international energy and commodities contracts since the COVID-19 pandemic. The legal fallout is ongoing.

Force Majeure Declarations  Iran Conflict, March 2026

The Strait of Hormuz, approximately 30 miles wide and connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, carries about 20% of the world’s oil supply. Its partial closure did not merely disrupt shipping; it invalidated the commercial assumptions underlying hundreds of energy, commodities and manufacturing supply contracts globally.

3. The Foreseeability Problem: When War Becomes Anticipated Risk

The most consequential legal battleground arising from the 2026 Iran conflict concerns the issue of foreseeability. Iran’s Parliament voted on 22 June 2025 to symbolically endorse the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. From that date, courts and arbitral tribunals have increasingly found that Hormuz disruption was a foreseeable risk and therefore not a qualifying force majeure event for contracts executed thereafter.

This principle is not confined to the Hormuz crisis. Courts in Russia, France, and the United Kingdom have progressively treated geopolitical instability in active conflict zones as foreseeable. The practical consequences for contract drafters are significant:

• A force majeure clause drafted in general terms (“war or civil unrest”) may be insufficient where the specific conflict was publicly known.
• Foreseeability carve-outs must expressly override the general rule: “whether or not foreseeable at the date of this Agreement.”
• Contracts executed post-June 2025 referencing Gulf energy supply face an elevated challenge to any Hormuz-based FM claim.
• Contemporaneous documentary evidence of performance prevention carrier notices, port authority decrees, and sanctions updates is essential from day one.

4. Sanctions as Force Majeure: Russia and the Evolving Compliance Architecture

The EU’s 20th sanctions package against Russia (April 2026) has compounded an already complex web of OFAC designations, UK OTSI measures and multilateral export controls. Sanctions present a structurally distinct force majeure problem: unlike physical events (war, natural disaster), sanctions are regulatory acts that may render performance not merely impossible but unlawful.

Sanctions and Force Majeure Characterisation (2026)

Critically, sanctions clauses and force majeure clauses serve different functions and must be drafted separately. A sanctions compliance clause typically imposes ongoing positive obligations (due diligence, screening, termination rights), whereas a force majeure clause allocates risk of non-performance. Conflating the two in a single boilerplate provision is one of the most common and costly drafting errors in contemporary international contracts.

5. Tariff Volatility: Can Economic Disruption Constitute Force Majeure?

The US tariff regime, sustained through 2025 and extended into 2026 despite the Supreme Court’s February 2026 ruling that IEEPA emergency tariffs exceeded presidential authority, has generated a novel and contested question: do sudden, government-imposed tariff changes constitute force majeure events?

The answer depends entirely on contract drafting. Under English law and most common law systems, courts have consistently refused to treat price increases or cost escalation, even dramatic ones, as force majeure. Economic hardship is not impossible. However, where a contract’s force majeure clause expressly lists “government-imposed trade restrictions”, “tariff changes” or “import/export controls”, tariff-driven non-performance may qualify.

• Contracts without express tariff adjustment or hardship clauses have no viable FM defence under English or New York law.
• UNIDROIT Principles Article 6.2.2 (hardship) offers civil-law parties a structured renegotiation pathway when FM fails.
• Under civil law systems (France, Germany, China), courts may invoke the doctrine of imprévision or change of circumstances even without an express clause.

6. Drafting Force Majeure for 2026 and Beyond: The Implementation Standard

The boilerplate force majeure clause that felt adequate in a stable world is no longer fit for purpose. The following represents the minimum implementation standard for international contracts executed in the current geopolitical environment:

Force Majeure Implementation Standard for International Contracts (2026)

7. Conclusion: Force Majeure as a Strategic Instrument

Force majeure has been transformed by the geopolitical supercycle of 2020 – 2026 from a peripheral boilerplate provision into a central strategic instrument of international commercial law. War in the Persian Gulf, compounding sanctions architecture, and US tariff volatility have each exposed the inadequacy of generic drafting and the catastrophic commercial consequences of clause failure.

The international commercial lawyer of 2026 must approach force majeure not as a standard clause to be borrowed from a precedent library, but as a bespoke risk-allocation instrument tailored to a specific transaction at a specific geopolitical moment.